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Papa Abel Remembers — The Tale of A Band of Booksellers, 
Fasicle 17: The Theater of Bibliographic Control
by Richard Abel  (Aged Independent Learner)  <reabel@q.com>
Shortly after Ralph Schoffner joined the band of Argonauts in 1972, we received a Request for Proposal from the University 
system of the University of California (not 
from any of the individual campuses but for 
all the then nine campuses).  The Request was 
to provide a plan for the conversion of all the 
nine system catalogs to machine (computer) 
readable form as well as estimates of length of 
time to complete such a project and costs.  We 
soon learned that this request had come at the 
urging of a committee of the California State 
Legislature, which in turn had been urged by 
the many high-tech industries located in the 
state.  The latter sought research help from 
the universities in the form of a union catalog 
— and one particularly oriented to the provi-
sion of information on the latest books pub-
lished.  This catalog was to contain but a single 
uniform entry (author, title, subject headings, 
etc.) together with a holdings indicator so an 
industrial borrower might turn to the closest 
university library.  This Request was received 
only about a week before the mid-winter 
American Library Association meeting in 
Chicago, and the Proposal was due about a 
week after the close of the meeting.
It was decided that Ralph was to be the 
point man player in preparing and writing the 
Proposal and that much of the intra-company 
consultation would be conducted at the ALA 
meeting.  I took a suite so we had a sitting 
room in which the consulting, exchange of 
ideas, and preliminary writing could be done 
in shifts as the various managers were free of 
obligations to meet with their librarians.  Ralph 
presided at all these variegated and ever-chang-
ing meetings. 
The main outlines of the way in which we 
would proceed was already fairly firmly em-
bedded in our cataloging and book processing 
procedures developed to provide shelf-ready 
undergraduate collections and shelf-ready 
opening day collections for new institutions. 
However, we knew much other work would 
be necessary to fulfill the objectives of this 
particular Request.  First, we knew that much 
author and subject control work had to be done 
to provide complete congruence between the 
collections.  Fortunately, before Don Chvatal 
moved on to the marketing position from the 
head of cataloging and book-processing, he 
had been insistent that the firm had to update 
and maintain the traditional authority files.  We 
had undertaken this project and found market 
interest from several of the new University of 
Texas campuses in 1971.  They sought a uni-
form catalog, which 
contained updated and 
uniform authority en-
tries and headings.
We were also pain-
fully aware of the se-
vere cataloging back-
logs accumulated in not simply the libraries 
involved in this Proposal but libraries around 
the world, which we were now serving.  These 
cumulating backlogs resulted from the speed 
with which we were getting books into librar-
ies on our Approval Plans.  The backlogs were 
particularly acute for titles published overseas, 
as we had developed systems of acquisition and 
distribution much more efficient and timely 
than the nineteenth-century procedures still 
being used by many of the major libraries 
around the world.  As a consequence, much 
current knowledge that we had shipped to 
fulfill Approval Plan requirements was sitting 
around for months on back-office shelves and 
so not available to users possessed of urgent 
research needs.  (We had been furnishing a 
poor substitute for this shortcoming in the 
form of a notification slip to be sent to users, a 
temporary author catalog card, and a temporary 
title catalog card in our Approval Plan form 
set.  But this was at best a band-aid approach 
to a massive and growing cataloging problem.) 
To meet the objectives of this Request we had 
to undertake the perpetual elimination of this 
backlog in the participating libraries employing 
our cataloging department.  This part of our 
operation was now managed by Kent Hen-
drickson, who had recently joined the band, 
so we had no qualms about the integrity and 
quality of our cataloging work.  (As I write I 
have just learned of Kent’s deeply regretted 
demise in an auto accident.)
We were undaunted by the magnitude of the 
databases which would result from our efforts 
for we had developed substantial databases 
for the Approval Plan, the New Collections, 
and the cataloging operations and had learned 
how to deal with large databases.  So, we were 
confident, as was the head Gary Olson, that 
the computer staff could readily handle this not 
overwhelming scale-up. 
In short, we were not only not overwhelmed 
by the magnitude and complexity of the project 
we were proposing but rather saw it as a pos-
sible avenue out of the unfavorable strategic 
position into which the coming of OCLC had 
placed us.  Further, we saw it as the means to 
recoup the substantial diminution in the value 
of our investments in software and staff occa-
sioned by the same development.  And lastly 
and most importantly we, of course, saw it as 
the solution to the increasingly vexing difficul-
ties of libraries in dealing with getting current 
knowledge to users.
Upon our return to Portland following 
the close of the ALA meeting, Ralph cast 
the Proposal into final 
form and sent it off by 
the stipulated dead-
line.  It had been a real 
grind involving several 
short nights for those 
involved in threshing 
it out.  In the course of our formulation of the 
Proposal, it had become clear to us that we 
should make a substantial effort to advise each 
of the libraries involved of the contents of the 
Proposal.  This for the reason that we were 
entirely uncertain of the extent of their knowl-
edge of this central University office initiative. 
We did not want to have any of the libraries, 
all of which were large and valued patrons, to 
be taken by surprise.  So, it was agreed that I 
would meet the manager of the San Francisco 
office in Sacramento Sunday of the following 
week to start a five-day itinerary beginning at 
the Davis campus to call on all nine libraries 
and explain our Proposal.  In mid-week the San 
Francisco manager returned and I met the Los 
Angeles office manager in Santa Barbara to 
complete our visits.  The second week follow-
ing this whirlwind tour of exposition I called 
the managers of both offices to learn of any 
feedback they may have had.  Both reported 
that they indeed had: the cataloging staffs at 
virtually every library believed that the firm 
was undertaking to put them out of work.  A 
piece of bad news indeed, for we needed no 
enemies among the technical services staffs 
of our patrons.
In any event, our Proposal was not acted 
upon by the University office.  We understand 
that this was because ours was the only pro-
posal received.  This fact could be taken as 
implying that ours was the only organization 
capable of undertaking such a major project. 
In this view, it could be said that the creative 
and forward-looking vision of the staff based 
upon a close understanding of the present and 
future needs of libraries was confirmed.  Al-
ternatively, it could be said that the firm was 
getting too far out in front of its market and 
was moving faster to cut new avenues in the 
matter of computer-bibliographic control than 
our patrons were comfortable with.  Or it might 
simply have been that the University office 
felt uncomfortable with awarding a contract 
to a sole bidder.
Whatever, now what may well have been 
another significant strategic error was commit-
ted by us — largely attributable to me.  I should 
have “connected the dots” differently, as the 
saying presently goes.  The way in which the 
dots were then connected was first the strange 
behavior of the ARL librarians vociferously 
attacking the L.C. contingent standing in the 
doorway and the resulting decision to terminate 
the luncheon for ARL librarians at an earlier 
Washington mid-winter.  The second dot to be 
connected was the response of several librar-
ians to shifting their catalog card purchasing 
from our firm to OCLC for reasons of profes-
sional motherhood and apple pie.  And the 
last dot to be connected was the angry and 
conspiracy-inspired response of the affected 
library cataloging staffs to our University of 
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California Proposal.  It may be argued that we were walking on eggs 
and had to give up or redirect the forward-looking drive of trying to 
marry the powers of the computer to the needs of bibliographic con-
trol.  Perhaps we should have slowed down the rate of innovation we 
had established as a company norm and so toned down the image of a 
hard-driving, hell-for-leather band of booksellers.  But that that is not 
how we conceived the way forward.
Our strategic situation as we saw it at that time may be summed up 
in the following terms:
I.  A radical new direction in University policies had developed 
rather rapidly. The changes of greatest import for libraries 
were:
A.  The amounts of money devoted to sci/tech research had 
increased rapidly in the years of the mid-1950s stimulated 
by the example of the development of radar, the atomic 
bomb, atomic-energy generation plants, jet aircraft propul-
sion, medical practices, etc., all resulting from infusions of 
research/development investment in the 1940s and 1950s. 
This impulse was quickened by the successful launch of the 
Russian spacecraft, Sputnik.  The new mantra was that uni-
versities should develop faculties and facilities of sufficient 
achievement to capture much of the public and private money 
available for research.
B.  Inevitably, the results of this avalanche of money and re-
search effort translated first, into an increase in journal pages 
and hence prices.  And secondly with about a 10-year lag into 
an increase in book authorship.  (Both streams of publication 
greatly stimulated by the widespread adoption of publication 
as a surrogate measure of achievement employed for purposes 
of hiring, promotion, tenure awards, faculty ranks, salary, 
scholarly society esteem, etc.)
C.  The sense of the growing administrative staffs devoted to 
building research prestige that libraries were simply a mon-
etary sinkhole.  (At a conference called by the librarian of a 
major research university seeking to reverse declining library 
budgets relative to other university departments, I recounted 
these factors and documented them with UNESCO-derived 
statistics.  Following my presentation the Provost turned to 
me, saying, “So, you are urging equivalent increases in the 
library materials budget.” Upon my affirmative response he 
replied, “We haven’t the money to do so.”  Needless to say I 
was struck nearly dumb by this response, well aware of the 
enormous sums this university had spent and was spending to 
develop and maintain its sci/tech research capabilities.)
D.  In the meantime university computer department staffs were 
urging the “paperless office/university” concept – as well as the 
“total university system.”  Neither of which, ironically, has yet 
appeared some 35 years later.  Administrators were mesmer-
ized by this vision of a cheaper set of control mechanisms, 
which offered them the ready handles for micro-managing 
universities and all aspects thereof.  (The University of Cali-
fornia RFP was obviously founded upon these premises, as 
were the several other failed or to fail university-wide library-
cataloging initiatives.)
E.  The vision of “open access” was promoted by the same 
aficionados of total systems.  The information requirements 
of research faculty could now be served by monies incor-
porated in grant proposals to pay for the papers specifically 
downloaded by research staff.  (Few grants incorporated funds 
to support the acquisition of additional materials by libraries 
— the latter were at best an element in “overhead costs.”)
II.  This concatenation of events and ideas imposed, we believed, 
a clear line of development and response for our firm.
A.  With the growing perceived importance of journals, con-
strained budgets led to reduced book purchases. It was, there-
fore, necessary for the firm to continue the thrust of reducing 
technical processes costs for book acquisitions and cataloging.  
These savings to be employed to partially maintain the book 
buying power of reduced library material budgets.
B.  In the meantime, competition in the supply of books had 
sprung up all about us — both domestically and overseas.  All 
manner of entrants had been attracted to the field.  Interest-
ingly, we had furnished the service and control templates used 
by virtually all of them.  Most of these competitors started by 
fulfilling “one-shot” orders originated by libraries.  This for 
the reason that libraries were rightfully prepared to try out new 
suppliers seeking both service and price advantages.
C.  However, these competitors soon perceived what the 
oldest firm in the game had long since discovered: that to 
remain profitable they had to cherry-pick such orders and 
return as OP, “unavailable through the trade,” “indefinitely 
out of stock,” and similar dodges those not comporting with 
their profit expectations.  We were still offering to acquire 
everything, including “gray literature.”  We believed we could 
hold our profit margins with innovation.  So, instead, we saw 
this emphasis upon a total service as having proved one of 
the key-stones of our place in the trade.
D.  By virtue of the above tactic, new dealers were able to beat 
us on discount.  We had long become hardened to this tactic.  
Our Texas office had for years subsisted upon the orders that 
the bidder traditionally winning the state-wide university sys-
tem of annual bidding based upon amount of discount offered, 
rejected, or failed to fulfill.  However, odious comparisons of 
our discounts relative to that of the competitors could still be 
made using selective data from dealers playing the discount 
game.  This pricing environment perpetually hamstrung our 
efforts to get shelf-ready books into libraries.
E.  However, the massive and unforgiving issue of bibliographic 
control remained one of the gorillas in the room.  We had tack-
led this issue at the interface of production and the market in 
a variety of ways, from Approval Plans for new/forthcoming 
books; standing order control; bibliographies of collections of 
back-list titles for undergraduate libraries; and bibliographies 
of collections of backlist titles for opening day collections for 
new institutions; to bibliographies of all the recently published 
scholarly titles published in all the major scholarly languages.  
We were well on the way to solving all the problems existing 
at the publisher/library buyer interface.
F.  We were routinely pursuing and occasionally investing in 
new ways of obtaining and exercising  bibliographic control 
of forthcoming and new titles.  Thus, by way of example, we 
retained the help of Derek Austin, the founder of the PRECIS 
system used for a time by the British Library, to investigate 
the utility of that system for Approval Plan purposes.  This with 
the aim of improving the book descriptions to assist librarians 
in selecting books to be retained from the Approval Plan.
III.  In supporting and expediting the pedagogic and research 
efforts of university faculty and the research undertakings of 
those in the private sector, we actively pursued new ways of 
speeding access to the most recent literature.
A.  As an aid in this search for means to advance the spread 
and use of book knowledge, Lyman Newlin had convinced 
most of the U.S. and Canadian publishers to supply us with 
a set of page-proofs for forthcoming titles.  This so we could 
profile the books before their appearance and have Approval 
Plan forms on hand when the books were received.
B.  To build upon this increase in speed and efficiency, we 
modified our distribution procedure so that most Approval 
Plan matches were made in New Jersey as soon as our truck 
picked up the new titles from the publishers’ warehouses in 
and around New York.  The books were then distributed by 
our own over-the-road trucks (K & C Freight Lines) to the 
various North American offices.
C.  In the meantime we had established a title profiling 
organization in the London office which profiled the new 
titles from the UK and the Amsterdam and Berne offices.  
This profiling information was transmitted to Portland by 
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overnight airfreight, computer Approval Plan matches then 
made, and the Approval Plan forms for both North Ameri-
can and overseas libraries air-freighted back for matching 
and consolidation into the airfreight shipment or to UK and 
Continental libraries.
IV.  The final scene in the theater of bibliographic control 
was located in the bibliographic control system employed by 
libraries — the catalog. In an effort to not only assist libraries 
in speeding the use of books but also to help reduce the total 
internal library cost of bibliographic control the firm had 
developed an integrated body of systems.
A.  The base element of the catalog bibliographic control 
problem was the flexible cataloging system  we had developed 
using both L.C. generated cataloging, plus our own if the for-
mer was not available in a timely way.  Clearly this effort was 
undertaken to minimize library costs in promptly providing 
cataloging because the books being acquired simultaneously 
triggered the supply of cataloging.
B.  In every case we had developed computer systems that 
would do these jobs at the lowest possible costs consistent 
with a dependable product of known quality.  Indeed, so ef-
fective and dependable were these databases and software 
systems that they were still in use by our successor firm into 
the twenty-first century.
C.  In the meantime, the strange new competitor of OCLC had 
sprung into being.  This well-financed, foundation-supported 
creature had shed its proposed purpose of creating a national 
computer-based catalog.  Rather it had, in fact, become the 
de facto producer/distributor of L.C. catalog card sets to aca-
demic and research libraries.  The appearance of this source in 
turn effectively dismantled the single trigger mechanism for 
acquiring both books and their bibliographic control apparatus 
we had worked to put into place.  So the objective of cutting 
costs and speeding user availability was compromised.  But 
it also signaled the second failure of a foundation-supported 
computer-based catalog (Nelinet was the first.)
D.  But perhaps the most aggravated cataloging problem was 
to be found in the growing backlogs of uncataloged books 
to be found on the technical processes holding shelves.  Li-
brary users were not being well-served by these sometimes 
months-long delays.  But surprisingly the firm was barred from 
solving this problem for all save a few libraries.  Turning to 
our cataloging it appeared seemed to most librarians to be a 
practice approaching the treasonable.
So, the strategic conclusion was reached that we had to push ahead 
as firmly as circumstance would permit to integrate the final facet of 
bibliographic control into the total system we had developed.  This 
conclusion led to involving our Washington lobbyist in attempting to 
devise a strategy to deal with this final integration, for the answer seemed 
to lay in the reaches thereof.  
Authorial comment:  In a sense I wish that I did not have to involve 
the reader in such a long, involved, and probably tedious, recital of the 
evolution of our corporate thinking and the ways in which we sought 
to frame the objective of the firm while remaining true to the original 
objective of effectively disseminating knowledge at minimal cost to the 
library community which we served.  It seemed to me, however, that 
only by giving readers a summary of the months of internal corporate 
debate, thinking, and planning could they understand the history of 
the voyage I am endeavoring to meaningfully relate. I hope readers 
will understand and appreciate this motive. — RA
